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Abstract: We critically evaluate Sprouse’s 1966 Journal of Accountancy 
article, which prodded the FASB towards a balance-sheet approach. 
We highlight three errors in this article. First, Sprouse confuses 
necessary and sufficient conditions by arguing that good accounting 
systems must satisfy the balance-sheet equation. Second, Sprouse’s 
insinuation that financial analysts rely on balance-sheet analysis is 
contradicted by contemporary and current security-analysis text-
books, analysts’ written reports, and interviews with analysts. Third, 
and most crucially, Sprouse does not recognize that the primary role 
of accounting systems is to help managers discover and exploit profit-
able exchange opportunities, without which firms cannot survive. 
INTRODUCTION
“Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are 
distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of 
a few years back” [Keynes, 1936, p. 383].
“If man is not to do more harm than good in his efforts 
to improve the social order, he will have to learn that in 
this, as in all other fields where essential complexity of 
an organized kind prevails, he cannot acquire the full 
knowledge which would make mastery of the events 
possible” [Hayek, 1975, p. 442]. 
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Soon after it was established, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) adopted an asset-liability approach 
supplanting the previous revenue-expense approach summa-
rized by Paton and Littleton [1940]. Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 6 [FASB, 1985a] begins by defining 
assets and liabilities and discusses income measurement only 
secondarily as reflecting changes in assets and liabilities. Many 
FASB standards are strongly influenced by this balance-sheet 
primacy perspective. Storey and Storey [1998, p. 76], who claim 
that the asset-liability approach is “the most controversial, and 
the most misunderstood and misrepresented, concept in the en-
tire conceptual framework,” argue that (p. 83): 
The revenue and expense view is still deeply ingrained 
in many accountants’ minds, and the first reaction to an 
accounting problem is to think about ‘proper matching 
of costs and revenues.’ Time will be needed for them to 
become accustomed to thinking first about effects of 
transactions or other events on assets or liabilities (or 
both) and then about how the effect on assets and lia-
bilities has affected revenues, expenses, gains, or losses. 
Many will be able to make that adjustment only with 
difficulty, and a significant number simply will make no 
attempt to do so, clinging instead to the revenue and ex-
pense view. The FASB’s experience suggests that a long 
tradition of ad hoc accounting principles has fostered 
a propensity to resist restraints on flexibility, especially 
those that limit an enterprise’s ability to decide what 
can be included in income for a period. (emphasis in 
original)
While a decade has passed since Storey and Storey penned these 
words, the revenue-expense view has not disappeared from the 
accounting lexicon [Barth, 2008, pp. 1,166-1,169]. 
The FASB’s asset-liability approach stems from an influen-
tial article by Robert T. Sprouse, titled “Accounting for What-
You-May-Call-Its” [Storey and Storey, 1998, pp. 51-69].1 Dr. 
Sprouse was an original member of the FASB (1973-1985), its 
 
1 Dr. Sprouse’s 2007 obituary noted that his “work had an enormous impact 
on the development of the board’s conceptual framework. His 1966 article, “Ac-
counting for What-You-May-Call-Its,” in the Journal of Accountancy, laid the 
groundwork for the FASB’s asset-liability approach.” Dr. Sprouse’s obituary can 
be found at www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/headlines/sprouseobit.html. Dr. Sprouse 
was president of the American Accounting Association (1972-1973) before joining 
the FASB.
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longstanding Vice Chairman (1975-1985), and his ideas shaped 
the FASB’s vision. The unanimous passage of SFAS 2 [FASB, 
1974] and SFAS 5 [FASB, 1975a] signaled the FASB’s commit-
ment to the primacy of the “asset-and-liability view” over the 
traditional “revenue-and-expense view” [Zeff, 2005, p. 20]. The 
FASB Conceptual Framework that was largely written during 
Dr. Sprouse’s FASB tenure enshrined this view for future U.S. 
standard setting. Because Sprouse [1966] was a formative factor 
in the current “asset-liability” approach to recognition and the 
“fair-value” approach to measurement, we re-evaluate its core 
arguments.2
Sprouse [1966, p. 45] makes two specific claims. First, ac-
counting’s foundation lies in the traditional balance-sheet iden-
tity that Assets = Liabilities + Equities. Second, if the balance-
sheet identity is valid, it implies that balance-sheet accounts that 
are inconsistent with specific definitions of assets and liabilities 
are fallacious. Sprouse’s key assertion is an “if-then” proposition 
that acceptance of the balance-sheet equation implies that it is 
the starting point for identifying a valid accounting system. To 
support his claim that investors emphasize the balance sheet, 
Sprouse cites the importance given to a “safety” measure in a 
recent edition of Graham and Dodd’s Security Analysis.
Sprouse’s claims have been widely, although not universally, 
accepted. Despite several recent critiques of the asset-liability 
approach [e.g., Benston et al., 2007; Penman, 2007; Dichev, 
2008; O’Brien, 2009; Palmrose, 2009], it pervades the new Con-
ceptual Framework project of the FASB and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and if left unchallenged, 
will likely shape U.S. and international accounting standards 
for decades to come.3 We revisit Sprouse’s original paper and
 
2 Soon after Sprouse [1966] was published, the Accounting Principles Board 
(APB) began a project in September 1968 to have marketable securities reported 
at fair value on the balance sheet. Intense lobbying against the proposal by finan-
cial firms led to the SEC rapidly distancing itself from the APB’s position (during 
September 1971 to March 1972), which contributed to the APB’s demise [Horn-
gren, 1973, pp. 63-64]. Early FASB standards such as SFAS 8 [FASB, 1975b] re-
suscitated the fair-value approach by requiring unrealized gains and losses from 
foreign currency transactions and translations to flow through earnings, provok-
ing strong opposition from firms and rapid modification of standards [e.g., SFAS 
52, FASB, 1981].
3 Although our focus is on the FASB, the IASB has advocated the balance-sheet 
approach more forcefully in recent years. The IASB maintains a webpage for the 
new Conceptual Framework at www.iasb.org/Current+Projects/IASB+Projects/
Conceptual+Framework/Conceptual+Framework.htm.
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develop three critiques (in ascending order of importance): (1) 
Sprouse commits a logical error by not distinguishing between 
necessary and sufficient conditions; (2) the evidence Sprouse 
cites actually supports the claim he seeks to refute; namely, that 
readers of financial statements place primary emphasis on the 
income statement; and (3) the asset-liability approach leads to 
an accounting system based on classificational double-entry, 
which erodes the direct link between accounting by double-entry 
and the economic function of a profit-seeking firm.4
In making his claims, Sprouse confuses necessary with 
sufficient conditions. He correctly states that a double-entry 
system that violates the balance-sheet identity is fallacious since 
a violation of the identity implies that the sum of all debits does 
not equal the sum of all credits. But, this merely restates the 
long-recognized value of double-entry as a recording system 
with built-in accuracy checks for a given classification of assets, 
liabilities, and equities [e.g., Ijiri, 1975]. However, Sprouse’s 
proposition can say nothing about whether one classification 
scheme is better than another. So long as accountants follow 
double-entry when journalizing and posting transactions, the 
balance-sheet identity must hold for any asset, liability, and 
equity definitions. Furthermore, it is far from self-evident that 
the balance sheet should comprise exactly and only these three 
categories.
Sprouse commits a second interpretational error when he 
suggests that investors primarily demand balance-sheet informa-
tion. Sprouse [1966, p. 45] quotes a definition of “safety” from 
Graham and Dodd’s Security Analysis to support his claim that 
some investors seek information on assets and liabilities. How-
ever, Sprouse simply misreads this classic text when he infers 
that investors’ interest in investment “safety” warrants greater 
accounting emphasis on the balance sheet. Graham and Dodd 
measure “margin of safety” using earning power, which they 
derive without using the balance sheet. Furthermore, a broader 
reading indicates that Graham and Dodd emphasize income-
statement analysis over balance-sheet analysis. In other words, 
Sprouse’s claim of balance-sheet primacy is roundly rejected 
by the very text he quotes to support his argument. Even more 
4 We use the term financial-statement “readers” because we have in mind peo-
ple who actually read financial statements and disclosures and then act upon that 
information. This stands in contrast to some prototypical “user” that has been 
self-constructed by standard setters and bears little resemblance to economic ac-
tors who make decisions in markets [Young, 2006].
4
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damning, Horngren [1955b] had previously documented that 
financial analysts overwhelmingly focused on the income state-
ment in their investment analyses. 
A third issue is subtler but of far greater significance. 
Sprouse’s balance-sheet primacy view essentially proposes an 
 accounting framework based on classificational double-entry. 
Such a system ignores the causality recognized when resource 
increments and decrements associated with exchange are simul-
taneously linked through the debit and credit of a journal entry 
[Ijiri, 1975, pp. 80-84]. A classificational, double-entry system 
does not align accounting measurement with a firm’s economic 
function, which is to discover profitable exchange opportunities 
in a world of uncertainty and costly knowledge [Coase, 1937; 
Hayek, 1945, 1968]. The historical-cost accounting system with 
an income-measurement focus has evolved over centuries to 
help firms make better decisions when competing with other 
firms and other economic institutions [Mises, 1952; Ball, 1989]. 
Emphasizing balance-sheet measurement rather than the 
value created through profit-seeking exchange transactions is a 
monumental mistake because it undermines each firm’s survival 
in competition with other organizations. While an immediate 
result is that the accounting system will not reflect a firm’s “busi-
ness model” [Dichev, 2008], the far bigger problem is that the 
accounting system no longer facilitates successful exchange and 
productive division of labor, which support successful market 
economies [Smith, 1776].
Mr. Sprouse’s legacy is now forever linked with the ultimate 
success of the FASB-IASB Conceptual Framework. We believe 
several legacies are possible. One is that the asset-liability ap-
proach will survive over the long haul and will eventually be 
viewed as having improved the quality of financial reporting 
worldwide. In this case, Sprouse [1966] will be hailed, in spite 
of its limitations, for persuasively articulating an important 
view of accounting that beneficially redirected standard setting. 
An alternative legacy is that the FASB will not survive, in part 
because the asset-liability approach lessens financial-reporting 
quality. In this case, Sprouse will be remembered as a progeni-
tor of what we view as dysfunctional accounting. A third pos-
sibility is that accountants are condemned to cycling between 
balance-sheet and income-statement approaches, evidenced by 
the income-statement approach of the 1930s itself supplanting 
an earlier balance-sheet focus [Hendriksen, 1970; Waymire and 
Basu, 2007]. Yet another alternative is that the debate will turn 
out to be moot because future financial-reporting improvements 
5
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will lead to a radically different reporting environment where 
readers can customize financial statements using any approach 
they want. We, of course, cannot distinguish these possibilities 
absent a crystal ball that allows us to peer into the future. None-
theless, since old ideas are frequently revived as times change, 
we advise accountants to preserve their copies of Paton and 
Littleton [1940] in case the income-statement approach is again 
resurgent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We detail 
Sprouse’s claims in the next section, and then discuss the is-
sues of necessary versus sufficient conditions, evidentiary 
support, and problems associated with classificational double-
entry in the following three sections respectively. A final sec-
tion contains our concluding thoughts on the legacy of Sprouse 
[1966]. 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF SPROUSE’S CLAIMS
The opening paragraph of Sprouse [1966] claims that Amer-
ican accounting students start their education with the balance-
sheet identity:
For most of us, among the very first subjects we were 
exposed to in the study of accounting was the funda-
mental accounting equation and the nature of its com-
ponents – assets, liabilities and owners’ equity. Slightly 
different terminology may have been used or it may 
have been stated in a slightly different way, but there 
never has been any doubt about the substance or the 
fundamental importance of the accounting equation: 
Assets equal liabilities plus owners’ equity. Indeed, the 
accounting equation is a truism – yet it is an extraor-
dinarily meaningful and useful one. The statement of 
financial position lists the entity’s resources and the 
claims against those resources; the difference is the 
owners’ equity. If one accepts the validity of the funda-
mental accounting equation, every account necessarily 
falls into one of those three categories – assets or liabili-
ties or owners’ equity – and an accounting analysis that 
ends up with anything that does not fit any of those 
three categories is necessarily fallacious. (emphasis in 
original) 
We critically examine Sprouse’s “if-then” proposition that if 
we accept that the balance-sheet identity as universally valid (at 
least under double-entry bookkeeping [DEB]), then accounting 
systems that fail to maintain the balance-sheet identity must be 
6
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fallacious.5
After recognizing that mid-1960s accounting practice em-
phasized income measurement, Sprouse [1966, p. 45] argues 
that attaching primary importance to income measurement 
could have negative consequences for financial statement users:
If this were only a matter of assuaging accounting theo-
reticians’ sensibilities, it could be chalked up as merely 
another conflict between what teachers teach and what 
practitioners do. On the other hand, if one is prepared 
to admit that users of financial statements often attach 
importance to the reported relationship between liabili-
ties and assets and to the reported earnings per share, 
this is a matter of considerable significance to both 
practitioners and academicians. 
Sprouse [1966, pp. 45-46] quotes the concept of “safety” 
from the most recent edition of Security Analysis [Graham et al., 
1962] to support this latter claim, saying:
We may reasonably assume that those who are con-
cerned with the relationship of liabilities and assets (or, 
stated another way, the relationship of debt and equity) 
are interested in liabilities as obligations to convey as-
sets or perform services – obligations representing a 
future demand on assets. This is the essence of finan-
cial position. For example, a leading reference in secu-
rity analysis presents the following ‘principle’: ‘Safety 
is measured not by a specific lien of contractual rights, 
but by the ability of the issuer to meet all its obliga-
tions.’ Accordingly, where what-you-may-call-its appear 
among the liabilities, the analyst is forced to do the ac-
countant’s job of determining whether such accounts 
are actually contra assets or an element of stockholders’ 
equity. Unfortunately, the analyst’s reclassification is 
almost certain to be based on less information than was 
available to the accountant.
In other words, Sprouse unilaterally assumes that some 
users are interested in a balance-sheet approach to valuation, 
and then further insinuates that some such users are financial 
analysts using the quotation as evidence. Sprouse next discusses 
5 One definition of a “fallacy” from Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary is 
“a false or mistaken idea.” We infer that Mr. Sprouse used the term fallacious to 
communicate the idea that accurate, high-quality accounting would not result 
when the balance-sheet identity was not maintained. 
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three contemporary accounting controversies where amortiza-
tion of poorly defined balance-sheet components resulted in 
artificially smoothed income. Sprouse [1966, p. 52] concludes by 
recommending development of a conceptual basis for account-
ing consistent with the asset-liability approach:
The emergence of the three kinds of what-you-may-call-
its discussed here underscores the crucial need for the 
kind of fundamental analytical framework the Account-
ing Principles Board was created to provide and utilize. 
In the absence of established fundamentals – funda-
mentals such as the nature of assets and the nature of 
liabilities, fundamentals that hopefully would lead logi-
cally and consistently to sound solutions to accounting’s 
many problems – one is forced to predict that, as new 
accounting problems arise, the number of what-you-
may-call-its will tend to increase. 
To summarize, Sprouse asserts that a balance sheet contain-
ing only well-defined assets, liabilities, and owners’ equity is the 
hallmark of a valid accounting system since the balance-sheet 
identity is a fundamental accounting relation. Quoting Graham 
and Dodd’s Security Analysis, Sprouse next infers that at least 
some users and analysts demand information on assets and 
liabilities and that effective security analysis requires better bal-
ance sheets. To achieve this, he recommends the development of 
a conceptual framework that starts by defining what he regards 
as the fundamentals – assets and liabilities.
SPROUSE’S CONFUSION BETWEEN  
NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
In this section, we consider the implications of the claim 
that if an accounting system fails to maintain the balance-sheet 
identity, then the resultant system is fallacious. This statement 
is true in that it establishes a necessary condition for account-
ing under double-entry, but it is not a sufficient condition. The 
balance-sheet equation can hold for any number of classifica-
tional, double-entry systems with fundamental differences in 
how assets, liabilities, and equities are defined. For instance, the 
balance-sheet equation can hold regardless of whether convert-
ible debt is classified as all equity, all liability, placed in a mezza-
nine equity section, or arbitrarily allocated between equity and 
liabilities.
DEB requires that the sum of debits is equal to the sum of 
credits for each transaction or event recorded by a journal entry, 
8
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and that this identity extends to the sum of debits and credits 
for multiple transactions. Thus, a trial balance struck among 
existing accounts will maintain the total debits = total credits 
identity so long as all individual entries and postings maintain 
this identity. Further, this identity holds regardless of which spe-
cific “nominal” accounts are pulled into the income statement. 
The balance-sheet identity will hold for a system where all R&D 
expenditures are immediately expensed as in SFAS 2 [FASB, 
1974], one where research costs are expensed but development 
costs are capitalized as in SFAS 86 [FASB, 1985b] for software 
costs, or one where all R&D costs are capitalized as assets.
The balance-sheet equation will hold even if incorrect 
measures are used. Consider a firm that pays $10,000 cash to ac-
quire a machine that is expected to last five years. Assume also 
that other firms purchased identical assets at the same time, 
but did not pay identical prices, perhaps because of differences 
in negotiating skill or information acquired through market 
search.6 For simplicity, assume that transaction prices in this 
asset market are uniformly distributed between a minimum of 
$10,000 and a maximum of $14,000. That is, the firm bought the 
machine for $2,000 less than the average price of $12,000 at the 
same point in time. 
The standard journal entry for this transaction would in-
volve a debit to a Long-Term Asset and a credit to Cash. After 
this entry, the balance sheet identity is maintained since assets 
are increased by $10,000 for the machine but reduced $10,000 
for the decrease in cash.
Suppose instead that this transaction had been recorded as 
follows:
Long-Term Assets (A) 12,000
 Gain on machine acquisition (OE) 2,000
 Cash (A) 10,000 
This journal entry would establish the long-term asset at its fair 
value of $12,000 (i.e., the average of exchange prices in market 
transactions consummated at the same time) with part of the 
offset going to an equity account for the gain. This entry would 
increase total assets by $2,000 (the difference between the long-
term asset increase and the cash decrease) and owners’ equity 
would increase by $2,000. 
Both treatments for this transaction maintain the balance-
sheet identity even though the totals of assets and equities differ. 
6 Price heterogeneity can persist under competition when buyers have hetero-
geneous information on the distribution of offer prices [Stigler, 1961].
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We cannot evaluate whether one treatment for the asset acquisi-
tion is more appropriate than the other by merely comparing 
consistency with the balance-sheet identity. Rather, that evalu-
ation requires separate definitions of asset, liability, and equity, 
and the definitions of these terms (along with definitions of in-
come) will determine whether the specific classifications applied 
within DEB are sensible. 
The balance-sheet identity will hold even if every alternate 
transaction is not recorded and even if fictitious transactions 
are recorded. Both a cash-basis accounting system and the U.S. 
tax-accounting system meet the balance-sheet equation. Put 
differently, there is nothing magical about a balance sheet that 
balances so long as DEB is being applied, and Sprouse’s balance-
sheet primacy would not ensure good accounting.
THE EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR SPROUSE’S  
CLAIMS OF BALANCE-SHEET PRIMACY
We next evaluate Sprouse’s evidence for his claim that some 
investors demand information primarily about assets and li-
abilities. Sprouse quotes Security Analysis, “Safety is measured 
not by a specific lien of contractual rights, but by the ability of 
the issuer to meet all its obligations,” to insinuate that at least 
some analysts focused primarily on the balance sheet. Sprouse 
is correct that Graham and Dodd considered “safety” to be of 
first-order importance in financial analysis, but he incorrectly 
 projects on to the second half of the quoted sentence his belief 
that security analysts use the balance sheet to measure safety. 
We claim that Sprouse misreads Security Analysis because 
Graham and Dodd measure “ability to meet obligations” using 
“earning power” rather than net-asset values. 
Unfortunately for Sprouse, Graham and Dodd’s primary 
“margin of safety” measure makes no reference to the balance 
sheet. In The Intelligent Investor, Graham [1973, pp. 277-287] 
summarizes the margin of safety as indicative of an investment-
grade security. In describing this concept in connection with 
bonds and preferred stocks, Graham states:
All experienced investors recognize that the margin-of-
safety concept is essential to the choice of sound bonds 
and preferred stocks. For example, a railroad should 
have earned its total fixed charges better than five times 
(before income tax), taking a period of years, for its 
bonds to qualify as investment-grade issues. This past 
ability to earn in excess of interest requirements consti-
10
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tutes the margin of safety that is counted on to protect 
the investor against loss or discomfiture in the event of 
some future decline in net income. (emphasis in origi-
nal)
Graham [1973, pp. 278-279] advocates a similar approach 
for common stocks by stating that a common stock’s margin of 
safety “lies in an expected earning power considerably above the 
going rate for bonds.” Graham’s primary measure of “safety” for 
both bondholders and stockholders is a coverage ratio calculated 
using income statement data and requires no data from the bal-
ance sheet. Sprouse’s suggestion that an investment’s “safety” 
is better measured by balance-sheet analysis than income-
 statement analysis is clearly inconsistent with Graham’s views. 
The idea that margin of safety should be measured primar-
ily in terms of net-asset values instead of earning power is gen-
erally absent in the original edition of Graham and Dodd [1934]. 
Graham and Dodd cite “margin of safety,” “safety,” or “risk” on 
39 separate pages, according to the book’s index. None of these 
citations make sole reference to corporate net assets or other 
balance-sheet measures, eight make reference only to corporate 
earnings, and three make reference to both earnings and net-
asset measures. Graham [1973, p. 278] does describe an alterna-
tive measure of margin of safety for a bond or preferred stock 
based on market values of securities, but this clearly is labeled 
as an alternative measure and is reported only after discussion 
of the income-based measure of margin of safety.
A broader review of Security Analysis is also inconsistent 
with a greater emphasis on the balance sheet than the income 
statement. Table 1 tabulates data on the contents of Graham 
and Dodd [1934]. Panel A indicates that the book runs 729 total 
pages with the core of the book conveyed in 52 chapters. Panel 
B indicates that Graham and Dodd devote roughly equal parts 
of the text to an analysis of bonds and preferred stocks (39% of 
total pages) and common stocks (40% of total pages). Within the 
chapters on common stocks, income-account analysis precedes 
balance-sheet analysis, and income analysis commands more 
than double the space (135 pages for the income statement, 57 
for the balance sheet).7 
7 After noting an earlier historical emphasis on net tangible asset book value, 
Graham and Dodd [1934, pp. 491-494] recognize that book value plays an impor-
tant, but secondary, role to earnings: “Before we discard completely this time-
honored conception of book value, let us ask whether it may ever have practical 
significance for the analyst. In the ordinary case, probably not. But what of the 
11
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TABLE 1
Description of Contents for Security Analysis  
by Graham and Dodd [1934]
A: Page Counts for Book Components in Security Analysis
Component Number of Pages
Preface & Table of Contents 5
Introduction 13
Main Text (in 52 Chapters) 603
Appendix 83
Index 25
TOTAL 729
B: Chapter and Page Counts for Parts of Main Text in Security Analysis
Title # Chapters # Pages
I. Survey and Approach 5 50
II. Fixed-Value Investments 16 173
III. Senior Securities with Speculative Features 5 62
IV. Theory of Common-Stock Investment: The 
Dividend Factor
4 51
V. Analysis of the Income Account: The Earnings 
Factor in Common-Stock Valuation
11 135
VI. Balance-Sheet Analysis: Implications of Asset 
Values
4 57
VII. Additional Aspects of Security Analysis, 
Discrepancies between Price and Value 7 75
TOTAL 52 603
Similarly, Graham and Dodd [1934] ascribe greater im-
portance to earnings and its coverage of interest than net-asset 
position in evaluating bonds and preferred stocks. As regards 
industrial bonds, Graham and Dodd [1934, p. 85] state that 
“the investor would seem to gain better protection against 
adverse developments by confining his industrial selections to 
companies which meet the two requirements of (1) dominant 
size, and (2) substantial margin of earnings over bond interest.” 
extraordinary or extreme case?....Book value deserves at least a fleeting glance by 
the public before it buys or sells shares in a business undertaking…Let the stock 
buyer, if he lays claim to intelligence, at least be able to tell himself, first, how 
much he is actually paying for the business, and secondly, what he is actually get-
ting for his money in terms of tangible resources.” (emphasis added)
12
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This statement is generalized subsequently as the “present-day 
investor is accustomed to regard the ratio of earnings to interest 
charges as the most important specific test of safety” [Graham 
and Dodd, 1934, p. 105]. The emphasis on coverage of capital 
charges applies also to preferred stocks [see Graham and Dodd, 
1934, pp. 158, 168].8
Our re-examination of Graham and Dodd’s text is inconsis-
tent with Sprouse’s inference that financial analysts should or 
actually do place greater emphasis on the balance sheet than 
the income statement. Nor were Sprouse’s views consistent with 
prevailing security analysis. For his Ph.D. dissertation, Horn-
gren [1955a] surveyed the investment analysis literature, scru-
tinized 123 written analyst reports, and interviewed 51 financial 
analysts to understand the information use of financial analysts. 
American financial analysts behaved largely as Graham and 
Dodd recommended. Horngren [1955b, p. 576] reported: 
The income statement is regarded as the most impor-
tant reflector of the operations of the firm. There is a 
definite tendency to think in terms of ‘normal earning 
power,’ but all components of the statement are exam-
ined carefully…The most important ratio is considered 
to be the percent of net operating profit before income 
taxes to sales. 
Previts et al. [1994] apply content analysis to more recent 
sell-side U.S. financial analysts’ reports and find that income-
statement-related terms or phrases appear three times as often 
as combined references to balance-sheet and cash-flow terms.9 
Francis et al. [1997] find that at corporate presentations to 
the New York Society of Security Analysts, management most 
8 As with common stocks, Graham and Dodd assigned a clearly secondary 
role to balance-sheet analysis for other securities like industrial bonds. Graham 
and Dodd [1934, p. 151] state: “For reasons already explained, a company’s state-
ment of its fixed assets will not ordinarily carry much weight in determining the 
soundness of its bonds. But the current-asset position has an important bearing 
upon the financial strength of nearly all industrial enterprises, and consequently 
the intending bond purchaser should give it close attention. It is true that indus-
trial bonds which meet the stringent tests already prescribed will in nearly every 
instance be found to make a satisfactory working-capital exhibit as well, but a 
separate check is nevertheless desirable in order to guard against the exceptional 
case.” (emphasis in original)
9 Breton and Taffler [2001] find that U.K. analyst reports are four times as 
likely to include profitability information as balance-sheet information, and ana-
lyst stock recommendations are significantly positively associated with the profit-
ability information but not with the balance-sheet information. 
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 frequently discusses revenues and earnings, and security 
analysts ask most frequently about sales revenues, earnings, and 
output prices. During conference calls, security analysts most 
frequently request data on recent operating performance com-
ponents such as revenues and costs and forecasts of future rev-
enues and costs [Tasker, 1998a].10 Chen et al. [2002] report that 
only about one-third of firms voluntarily disclose balance sheets 
in their quarterly earnings announcements, suggestive of lower 
demand for balance-sheet data.
Furthermore, analysts prefer earnings computed without 
a balance-sheet focus.11 As Black [1980, p. 19] trenchantly ob-
serves:
Users of financial statements – analysts, stockholders, 
creditors, managers, tax authorities and even econo-
mists – really want an earnings figure that measures 
value, not change in value. Analysts, for example, want 
an earnings number they can multiply by a standard 
price-earnings ratio to arrive at an estimate of the firm’s 
value. Accordingly, the ideal set of accounting rules is 
one that makes the price-earnings ratio as constant as 
possible. The main thing lacking in present accounting 
practice is the recognition that this has been the goal all 
along.
Consistent with this claim, Philbrick and Ricks [1991], Gu 
and Chen [2004], and others report that in constructing “street 
earnings,” financial analysts routinely discard non-recurring, 
income-statement items (called special items by Compustat) that 
are generated by GAAP attempts to measure the balance-sheet 
accurately.12 Demirakos et al. [2004] analyze the contents of ana-
lysts’ reports and find that the most common valuation models 
are based on price-earnings multiples, whereas book-value-of-
10 Tasker [1998b] summarizes the transcripts of two typical quarterly confer-
ence calls which clearly show that analysts usually focus on recent operating per-
formance and prospects for future revenues and costs.
11 Gilman [1941] surveyed 300 bank credit analysts to determine the impor-
tance of the lower-of-cost-or-market inventory valuation rule for credit analysis. 
Of the 176 respondents (58.7% of 300), 131 (74.4% of 176) replied that they would 
be satisfied with both balance sheet and income statement reported at cost if 
the lower-of-cost-or-market inventory valuation number was also disclosed paren-
thetically on the balance sheet or in a footnote. The survey results appear incon-
sistent with a single-best, balance-sheet format.
12 Financial analysts also state that they are unlikely to find the capitalization 
of intangible assets on the balance sheet to be useful despite the FASB’s and the 
IASB’s claims that analysts want this information [e.g., Elwin, 2008].
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equity multiples or asset multiples are rarely used. Asquith et al. 
[2005] find that members of Institutional Investor’s All-American 
Research Team are far more likely to use models based on earn-
ings, cash flow, or sales (99%) than market-to-book (25%). 
In short, both Graham and Dodd’s textbook and analysis of 
contemporary security-analyst behavior suggest that Sprouse’s 
evidence provides a very shaky foundation for balance-sheet pri-
macy in the current conceptual framework.
THE ASSET-LIABILITY APPROACH AND 
CLASSIFICATIONAL DOUBLE-ENTRY
We now discuss how classificational double-entry inherent 
in the asset-liability approach is likely misaligned with the eco-
nomic function of accounting. Our argument derives from the 
frequently overlooked importance of causal double-entry in the 
discovery and exploitation of profitable exchange transactions, 
which is the most important reason that firms even exist. We 
trace the economic arguments for a focus on income measure-
ment from modern economists like Ijiri [1975] and Hicks [1939] 
back to the writings of Adam Smith and his contemporaries. We 
discuss historical research showing that earnings power was 
used for valuing firms even earlier. Finally, we draw on Coase 
[1937], Mises [1949], and others to explain why a historical 
transaction-based income-statement approach is vital for entre-
preneurial decision making. 
Ijiri [1975, pp. 51-69] identifies three concepts inherent 
to economic performance measurement under double-entry 
accounting (DEA). Control represents the extent to which an 
organization has economic control over the use of resources, 
and quantities refer to an ability to quantify differing degrees to 
which resources exist. The third, and most important, concept 
is exchanges, which includes “not only exchanges in a market, 
but also exchanges in production which may be considered ex-
changes between the entity and nature” [Ijiri, 1975, pp. 60-61]. 
Exchanges is a foundational concept in accounting because of 
“the perceived cause-and-effect relationship between a sacrifice 
(a decrement) and a benefit (an increment), namely the benefit 
cannot be obtained without the sacrifice.” While a classification-
al, double-entry system is built with only the control and quanti-
ties concepts, a causal double-entry system also incorporates the 
powerful exchanges concept.
Ijiri [1975, pp. 81-84] argues that the causal relation be-
tween benefit and sacrifice inherent to reciprocal exchange, 
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manifested in debit and credit, is the essence of DEA and is as-
sociated with powerful cognitive forces that alter how we view 
exchange:
There are two entirely different reasons why debit 
should equal credit. One is that both are based on dif-
ferent classifications or descriptions of the same object. 
We call this type of double-entry classificational double-
entry. For example, the double-entry bookkeeping sys-
tem is often taught by starting with the fundamental 
equation assets = equities, because the two are consid-
ered to be different classifications of the same set of re-
sources, one based on the types of assets and the other 
based on claims upon them.
The other type of double-entry is what we may call 
causal double-entry, where the value of an increment 
(debit) is set equal to the value of a decrement (credit), 
as in (Dr.) Inventories $100: (Cr.) Cash $100. Here the 
same set of resources is not classified from two view-
points. This entry clearly involves two different re-
sources, cash and inventories. They are tied together 
because of the cause-and-effect relationship between 
the increment and the decrement…. 
Apparently, double-entry can enormously affect our 
perception of economic events. Under a so-called 
single-entry system, a cashier can keep his record quite 
independently from a warehouse bookkeeper who 
records inventories and inventory changes. But an 
accountant who is trained in double-entry bookkeep-
ing cannot treat a decrease in cash or an increase in 
inventories independent of each other. A decrease in 
cash alone cannot be recorded unless he finds a proper 
debit account. In doing so, he is led to recognize the 
cause-and-effect relationship of changes in resources. 
Eventually, he acquires the habit of always looking at a 
change in relation to other changes rather than in iso-
lation…. Thus, it should be remembered that the real 
significance of double-entry bookkeeping compared to 
single-entry bookkeeping is not in dual classification or 
the computational double-check (what a triviality!), but 
in the power of double-entry to make us look into the 
cause-and-effect relationship among the changes in the 
resources controlled by the entity. 
In contrast, economic exchange is, at best, a secondary ele-
ment of the asset-liability approach. This approach starts by de-
fining and measuring assets and liabilities with the resultant re-
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sidual being equity; i.e., wealth. Income is the change in wealth 
that arises from either an exchange transaction or another event 
that alters the store of wealth. Thus, income measurement un-
der the asset-liability approach must capture both the effects of 
exchange transactions as well as holding gains and losses. This 
measure appears superficially consistent with a theoretical view 
of income posited by Hicks [1939], and has been cited as a basis 
for the FASB and the IASB conceptual frameworks [Schipper 
and Vincent, 2003; Barth, 2008, p. 1,168].
Hicks’ [1939, p. 173] first measure of income (“Income No. 
1”) is “the maximum which can be spent during a period if there 
is to be an expectation of maintaining intact the capital value 
of prospective receipts (in money terms).”13 However, Hicksian 
income is defined only for a world of complete and perfect mar-
kets and is less useful for a firm operating in costly incomplete 
markets. Hicks [1939, pp. 193-196] describes a firm’s decision as 
the “establishment of a production plan,” with an optimal pro-
duction plan maximizing the “surplus of receipts over costs,” or 
the capitalized value of all future expected surpluses in a multi-
period setting. Within this context, Hicks defines business profit 
as surplus of receipts over costs less charges from prior com-
mitments less depreciation (or plus appreciation). Thus, Hicks 
posits that the firm chooses production plans to increase profits 
which arise from interactions in product and factor markets.14 
Hicks [1939, pp. 179] specifically excludes unrealized gains 
and losses from such planning, saying: “The income which is 
relevant to conduct must always exclude windfall gains; if they 
occur, they have to be thought of as raising income for future 
weeks (by the interest on them) rather than as entering into any 
effective sort of income for the current week. Theoretical confu-
sion between income ex post and ex ante corresponds to practi-
cal confusion between income and capital.” Hicks explains that 
decisions should be based on real rather than nominal income, 
13 In considering complications from interest rate and consumption price 
changes, he also developed two other income constructs. Hicks [1939, p. 174] 
defines “Income No. 2” as “the maximum amount the individual can spend this 
week, and still expect to be able to spend the same amount in each ensuing week” 
and “Income No. 3” as “the maximum amount which the individual can spend 
this week, and still expect to be able to spend the same amount in real terms in 
each ensuing week.” (emphasis in original)
14  Bromwich et al. [2010] and Jameson [2005] critique the application of 
Hicks [1939] to practical matters of income measurement, and point out that 
Hicks advocated an earnings power focus in practice. Klamer [1989, pp. 179-180] 
points out that Hicks himself was uncertain as to how income should be mea-
sured.
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implying that variations in prices should be excluded from cal-
culation of capital values, which is exactly opposite to the FASB/
IASB fair-value measurement approach.
A concern with Hicks [1939] and neoclassical economics 
more generally is that it does not explain the nature and role of 
accounting within profit-seeking firms that operate in markets 
that are themselves dependent on complex economic institu-
tions. The balance-sheet approach takes market values as given 
rather than resulting from the interaction of profit-seeking indi-
viduals. Kohn [2004, p. 314] summarizes limitations of the “val-
ue paradigm” that relies on neoclassical economics as follows:
The approach of the value paradigm, like that of tradi-
tional mathematical theory in the natural sciences, is a 
special approach that is valid only in a subset of cases. 
We can be more specific if we divide the domain of 
economic theory according to the three basic questions 
addressed by Adam Smith: How are relative prices de-
termined? How is economic activity coordinated? What 
are the causes of economic growth? The special ap-
proach of the value paradigm is reasonably successful 
when applied to the first of these questions. It is not un-
realistic to think of the forces that determine prices, at 
least in the short run, as being relatively powerful and 
rapid, relying as they do primarily on trading and arbi-
trage. In these circumstances, the assumption of trad-
ing equilibrium is a fruitful simplification – fruitful be-
cause it permits the greater precision and logical clarity 
of mathematical reasoning. However, when applied to 
questions of coordination and growth the assumption 
of trading equilibrium is not at all realistic….
To reiterate, there is nothing wrong with the theory of 
value as a theory of value. Indeed in many ways it is 
the crown jewel of economics. The problem is with the 
value paradigm – that is, with the attempt to extend as-
sumptions that are appropriate to the theory of value 
to areas of economics where they are not appropriate. 
The theory of value is a special or partial theory, not a 
general theory. 
Kohn [2004] suggests that Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations 
is a useful starting point for thinking about economics. Smith’s 
[1776, p. 17] hypothesis is that specialized division of labor, 
coupled with opportunities for market exchange, generates hu-
man wealth [Kimbrough et al., 2008]. This foundational insight 
helps us better understand why economic institutions emerge to 
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foster favorable performance outcomes (e.g., higher total out-
put) [Stigler, 1951; Buchanan, 1964; North, 2005; Smith, 2008]. 
Accounting is likely one such institution that has evolved to 
facilitate mutually beneficial exchange that increases the wealth 
of the transacting parties [Waymire and Basu, 2007; Basu et al., 
2009; Waymire, 2009].
The Wealth of Nations was a seminal event in the develop-
ment of economics as a scientific discipline [Samuelson, 1948, p. 
136]. It is thus interesting to consider what Smith thought about 
valuation and performance measurement. Smith asserted that a 
nation’s economic progress was measured by productive activity 
that enabled greater consumption. Smith [1776, p. 1] states his 
view, which was contrary to prevailing orthodoxy, in his opening 
sentence: 
The annual labor of every nation is the fund which sup-
plies it with all the necessaries and conveniences of life 
which it annually consumes, and which consist always 
of either in the immediate produce of that labor, or in 
what is purchased with that produce from other na-
tions.15 
The Wealth of Nations provides a conceptual basis for eco-
nomic performance measures such as Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) [Samuelson, 1948, p. 11].16 GDP is directly measured 
using a “product approach” by summing the “values added” by 
each enterprise in the society after adjusting for taxes and subsi-
dies.17 The “value added” by a given enterprise is the sales of its 
final goods or services less the cost of intermediate goods used 
to produce final output [Samuelson, 1948, pp. 232-234]. In other 
words, Smith [1776] argued for an income-statement approach 
whose focus was on wealth creation in place of a balance-sheet 
approach focused on wealth storage.
Robert Hamilton, a contemporary of Adam Smith, intro-
15 Smith’s purpose in writing The Wealth of Nations was to discredit the con-
temporary economic orthodoxy of mercantilism [Sowell, 2006, pp. 5-13]. Mercan-
tilism advocated the accumulation of wealth as reflected in the store of monetary 
assets such as gold, and can be viewed as a distant precursor of the balance-sheet 
approach.
16 The argument favoring total output as a macroeconomic performance mea-
sure predates Smith; e.g., William Petty suggested this measure in the 17th cen-
tury (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Petty). 
17 A summary of GDP measurement is available at en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Gross_domestic_product, and the national income accounts used by the U.S. gov-
ernment are described in BEA [2009]. Marcuss and Kane [2007] provide a review 
of the historical development of the U.S. national-income accounts.
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duced the idea of residual income (but not the term itself) by 
arguing that a firm must earn more than its cost of debt and eq-
uity capital to create wealth [Mepham, 1983]. Hamilton [1777, 
Part V, Chapter III, Section 8] states:
In all commercial countries there is a fixed rate of inter-
est, and the merchant’s gain should only be estimated 
by the excess of his gross profits above the interest of 
his stock. The latter may be obtained with little risk or 
trouble; the former alone is the reward of his industry 
and the compensation for his hazard. And, if the profit 
of his trade be less than his stock would have yielded at 
common interest, he may properly account it a losing 
one.
Hamilton [1777, Part V, Chapter V, Section 27] emphasizes 
the relevance of income measurement for managerial decision 
making, saying: “When a person is engaged in several branches 
of manufacture, whether on different materials, or on the same 
materials through successive stages, he should keep his books in 
such a manner as to exhibit the gain or loss on each.” This rec-
ommendation is explained by modern economic analyses.
A firm adds value by generating greater net gains from spe-
cialized labor than could be attained solely through a set of pro-
duction decisions executed via a series of market transactions. 
Coase [1937, pp. 390-391] states this proposition as: 
The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm 
would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price 
mechanism. The most obvious cost of ‘organizing’ pro-
duction through the price mechanism is that of discov-
ering what the relevant prices are…. (i)t is important 
to note the character of the contract into which a fac-
tor enters that is employed within a firm. The contract 
is one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration 
(which may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the 
directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits. (em-
phasis in original)
The entrepreneur thus performs a discovery function that 
includes developing products, identifying customers, and orga-
nizing production.18 These functions are performed within the 
18 Cheung [1983] suggests that the costs of using the market to coordinate 
production include the number of heterogeneous transactions required, the costs 
to consumers of knowing all attributes of a product, the costs of measuring those 
attributes, and the problem of defining prices in a joint task involving collabora-
tion between two factors.
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context of a competitive process that creates strong incentives 
to exploit knowledge pertinent to the firm’s local circumstances 
[Hayek, 1945, 1968]. Consequently, the defining event in a com-
petitive process where transactions result from the entrepre-
neur’s actions is the successful consummation of exchange with 
a customer. Accounting facilitates discovery of consumer prefer-
ences and more efficient means for satisfying those preferences 
[Vatter, 1950; Demski and Feltham, 1976; Kaplan and Norton, 
1996]. Causal DEA can thus be an extraordinarily powerful tool 
for identifying and quantifying the consequences of exchange 
interactions between a firm, factor suppliers, and the eventual 
consumers of the firm’s output.
Surviving historical records shows that entrepreneurs and 
financiers for the last several centuries have evaluated firms us-
ing variants of earning power [e.g., Bryer, 2000; Toms, 2010]. 
Merchants in feudal England frequently computed gross profits 
on individual transactions to decide their prices [Grassby, 1995, 
p. 236]. Robert Loder of Romney Marsh calculated the rate of 
return on capital using a single-entry bookkeeping system, and 
by 1611 was calculating residual income [Bryer, 2000]. In 1654, 
the East India Company reported the rates of return on capital 
for all of its early voyages to its stockholders [Chaudhuri, 1965, 
p. 209]. Several examples of similar computations in agricul-
ture, coal, textiles, and mining have been documented over the 
next two centuries [e.g., Toms, 2010]. Thomas Hall in 1834-1835 
was discounting forecasted profits using a 12.5% interest rate, 
an early example of discounted cash-flow analysis [Fleischman 
and Parker, 1997]. To summarize, there is a long English history 
of computing profits using historical cost to aid in running the 
business and for investors to evaluate the firm. 
The “fatal flaw” in classificational double-entry is that it 
expands the set of conditions that call for entries to the books of 
account. This cuts the link between the accounts and the causal 
forces that generate transactions. A classificational system per-
mits changes to the accounts for a broad range of counterfactual 
circumstances beyond the set of consummated transactions. In 
other words, “fair value” measurements reflect gains that may 
never be realized because the assumed transactions will never 
occur.
To clarify, a journal entry resulting from a consummated 
transaction encodes several simultaneously determined attri-
butes of a transaction. Obvious attributes include the price and 
quantity for which a transaction is consummated. A less obvious 
but far more important attribute of any consummated transac-
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tion is the underlying decision to transact. This decision is of vital 
importance in a world where it takes skill and effort to discover 
favorable opportunities to transact with customers and factor 
suppliers. Stated differently, the decision to transact reflects an 
entrepreneur’s decision to “cause” the consummation of a spe-
cific transaction, when the firm’s raison d’être is to identify and 
transact value-increasing exchanges.19
The accountant’s focus on consummated transactions, with 
an emphasis on objective, verifiable evidence of arm’s length 
exchange, is the likely “reason for the persistent use of histori-
cal cost in accounting over many centuries” [Ijiri, 1983, p. 79]. 
The need for objective and verifiable evidence of consummated 
transactions is a guiding feature of the framework of Paton and 
Littleton [1940, pp. 18-21; see Ijiri, 1980, pp. 622-623]. Paton 
and Littleton [1940, p. 10] assert the primacy of historical-cost-
based income measurement derived from repeated application 
of the revenue-realization and expense-matching principles. 
These principles applied to objective verifiable evidence align 
recognition of “effort and accomplishment” [Paton and Little-
ton, 1940, pp. 14-18; Ijiri, 1980, p. 623; Ball, 1989].
So, what do we believe is lost by eroding the foundation of 
double-entry built on causality in exchange? Over the centuries, 
various scholars have written of the interdependent changes 
wrought by double-entry accounting on human cognition and 
the development of modern capitalist organizations [Sombart, 
1919; Weber, 1927; Schumpeter, 1942; Mises, 1949; Ijiri, 1975, 
pp. 81-84].20 The notion that double-entry reflects the causality 
of action in exchange was reinforced over 450 years after Pacioli 
[1494] by Mises [1949, p. 231] when he stated:
It was economic calculation that assigned to measure-
ment, number, and reckoning the role they play in our 
quantitative and computing civilization….Monetary cal-
19 When the FASB and the IASB proposed removing stewardship as an objec-
tive of financial reporting in their Preliminary Views [FASB, 2006] consistent with 
their focus on balance-sheet valuation, an overwhelming majority of respondents 
preferred to retain stewardship or accountability, consistent with a contracting 
perspective.
20 Pacioli noted such effects when he wrote of the need for accurate records 
and accounts “so that one may get, without loss of time, all the particulars as to 
the debit and also the credit of all of them, as business does not deal with any-
thing else. This is very useful, because it would be impossible to conduct business 
without due order of recording, for without rest, merchants would always be in 
great mental trouble” [Pacioli, 1494, p. 1, quoted by Carruthers and Espeland, 
1991, p. 36].
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culation reaches its full perfection in capital account-
ing. It establishes the money prices of available means 
and confronts this total with the changes brought about 
by action and by the operation of other factors. This 
confrontation shows what changes occurred in the 
state of acting men’s affairs, and the magnitude of those 
changes; it makes success and failure, profit and loss as-
certainable….Our civilization is inseparably linked with 
our methods of economic calculation. It would perish if 
we were to abandon this most precious intellectual tool 
of acting. Goethe was right in calling bookkeeping by 
double entry ‘one of the finest inventions of the human 
mind.’ 
Thus, a classificational system like that advocated by 
Sprouse severs the link between accounting and economic ex-
change, which is the fundamental focus of economic activity. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON THE LEGACY 
OF THE ASSET-LIABILITY APPROACH
Sprouse [1966] is important neither because of its conceptu-
al insights nor because of its unpersuasive evidence. Rather, the 
article matters mainly because it shaped the FASB’s rhetoric and 
subsequent standard-setting approach and today’s international 
standard-setting agenda. Sprouse’s misinterpretation of Graham 
and Dodd’s Security Analysis foreshadows the FASB and IASB 
misinterpretation of Hicks [1939]. Sprouse and the two Boards 
are equally culpable in ignoring actual security-analyst behavior 
when advocating their preferences, relying instead on made-up 
“users” [Young 2006]. Thus, the current FASB/IASB Conceptual 
Framework [FASB, 2006] is justifiably seen as a direct descen-
dant of Sprouse [1966]. 
Sprouse and the two Boards ignore the implications (or 
are unaware) of one of the major stylized facts of U.S. financial 
reporting history – the shift from a balance-sheet approach to 
an income-statement approach during 1900-1930. The shift to 
an income-statement approach is usually attributed to the in-
formation needs of a massive influx of individual investors into 
U.S. equity markets during this era [e.g., Hendriksen, 1970, pp. 
51-55].21 If individual equity investors are primarily interested 
in balance-sheet information, then this shift should not have oc-
curred when it did. Sprouse and the two Boards never address 
21 U.S. shareholders more than tripled in number between 1900 and 1923 with 
greater middle-class participation [Warshow, 1924].
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this salient historical evidence that contradicts their core as-
sumption of investor information needs. More broadly, Sprouse 
and the two Boards ignore the historical development of the 
revenue-expense approach, both in theory and practice, which 
we survey in this paper. If financial accounting has emerged over 
many generations to maintain consilience with the biologically 
evolved human brain [Dickhaut et al., 2010], then an abrupt 
change to a fair-value-based, asset-liability approach might well 
make financial reports less useful to actual human readers.
Contrary to the theoretical ruminations of Sprouse, security 
analysts to this day rely primarily on earnings forecasts in valu-
ing firms. However, today’s analysts can construct their earnings 
forecasts only after adjusting for many more non-recurring 
items that the FASB has introduced into the income statement. 
Although SFAS 130 [FASB, 1997] introduced a broader, compre-
hensive income concept that includes even more non-recurring 
items, analysts show no interest in forecasting it or using it in 
their analyses. We believe that the FASB’s shift in focus to the 
balance sheet has created bigger problems than merely whether 
financial analysts have to adjust for new income statement 
“thingamajigs” instead of balance sheet “what-you-may-call-its.” 
We claim that the lack of analyst interest in the FASB-mandated, 
non-recurring items is symptomatic of a monumental mistake 
in the asset-liability approach; specifically, it is misaligned with 
the reasons that firms exist and the resulting demand for causal 
double-entry accounting as an economic institution.22 In other 
words, while the asset-liability approach is constructively ratio-
nal, i.e. deduced from assumptions that work in a theoretical 
model, it is unlikely to be ecologically rational in the sense of 
improving firms’ survival prospects in the complex real world 
[Sargent, 2008; Smith, 2008]. 
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